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Chapter 12 [revised- Dec. 2009]
Late Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, and Their Aftermath
David Ingram

Introduction
Developments in Anglo-American philosophy during the first half of the 20th
Century closely tracked developments that were occurring in continental philosophy
during this period. This should not surprise us. Aside from the fertile communication
between these ostensibly separate traditions, both were responding to problems
associated with the rise of mass society. Rabid nationalism, corporate statism, and
totalitarianism (Left and Right) posed a profound challenge to the idealistic rationalism of
neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian philosophies. The decline of the individual – classically
conceived by the 18th-century Enlightenment as a self-determining agent – provoked
strong reactions. While some philosophical tendencies sought to re-conceive the
relationship between individual, society, and nature in more organic ways that radically
departed from the subjectivism associated with classical Cartesianism, other tendencies
sought to do just the opposite. This is one way of putting the difference between the two
major movements within Anglo-American philosophy that I will be discussing in this
essay.
American pragmatism, which achieved the pinnacle of its popularity prior to
1940, traces its lineage back to empiricism as well as German Idealism. With the
exception of William James, who is best known for his defense of radical empiricism, the
other two important 20th century pragmatists, John Dewey (1859–1952) and George
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Herbert Mead (1863–1931), embraced a post-metaphysical version of Hegelian dialectics
that was starkly antithetical to both Cartesian rationalism and atomistic empiricism. By
contrast, logical positivism, which maintained a lively hold on Anglo-American thought
as late as the sixties, reacted against Hegelian philosophy in all its forms, and accordingly
resurrected both the Cartesian method of conceptual (logical) analysis as well as its
atomistic ontology.
In this respect, positivism is closer in spirit to Husserlian phenomenology and
French structuralism, while pragmatism is closer in spirit to Heideggerian existentialism
and its French progeny (the outstanding exception being Sartre’s early Cartesian
existentialism). As a general rule, the pragmatists’ embrace of methodological holism
served as counterpoint to the positivists’ endorsement of methodological individualism.
However, in contrast to their continental counterparts, pragmatists and positivists shared
the naturalistic approach to philosophical explanation that had been the hallmark of
Anglo-American philosophy since Bacon.

Pragmatism

In order to understand the complex relationship between Anglo-American
philosophy and continental philosophy during the inter-War years, we would need to
trace the genealogy of logical positivism and American pragmatism back to their late19th-century continental antecedents. This dimension has been so thoroughly explored
by others that little need be said here about this fascinating chapter in Western
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philosophy.1 Aside from some notable exceptions – such as Husserl’s positive reaction to
some of William James’s earlier ideas concerning experiential psychology (including
Jame’s notion of an experiential “fringe,” which Husserl credits as a precursor to his own
Deleted: Suffice it to say

notion of “horizon”) -- the reception of American pragmatism by English, German, and
French philosophy in the early decades of the 20th century was clouded by prejudicial
misunderstanding that was partly abetted by the very philosopher who gave this
movement its name. The German translation of William James’s Pragmatism: A New
Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907) by Wilhelm Jerusalem in 1908 catapulted
pragmatism into the central topic of discussion at the World Philosophical Congress held
at Heidelberg that very same year. James’s assertion in that book that “the true … is only
the expedient in the way of our thinking”2 – led many of his German contemporaries to
dismiss this “new fad in philosophy … from the land of the dollar” as (in the words of
one critic) a degradation of “the truth to the level of expediency, just as in days gone by, a
similar way of thinking was imported to us from the land of shopkeepers [i.e., Britain]
preaching the reduction of morality to utility.”3 The crassest misrepresentations of
pragmatism spawned by this untimely reception have been the subject of a withering
critique by Hans Joas. These include the view that pragmatism

reduces truth to utility;
1

See Joas, Pragmatism and Social Theory.

2

James, Pragmatism, p. 222.

3

Gutberlet, “Der Pragmatismus,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 21 (1908), pp. 437, 445,
quoted in Joas, p. 98.
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endorses Cartesian subjectivism; and
represents a mishmash of Ernst Mach’s empirico-criticism, Friedrich
Nietzsche’s perspectivalism and will to power, and German Lebensphilosophie.4

These misconceptions about pragmatism continued to inform German philosophy for the
next four decades, as can be seen from Max Scheler’s and Horkheimer’s unsympathetic
comments.5 Strikingly absent from this reception is any mention of the profound impact
4

Ibid., p. 99.

5

In his book Erkenntnis und Arbeit (1926), Scheler reduced pragmatism to a “knowledge
of productivity,” which he distinguishes from a knowledge of culture
(Bildungswissen) and a knowledge of redemption (Erlösungswissen). More tellingly,
he equated this knowledge of productivity with a “knowledge of domination” that in
his mind was largely indistinguishable from the kind of narrow instrumentalism that
characterized positivism. Scheler’s interpretation of pragmatism served as the
dominant reference point for Max Horkheimer’s dismissive treatment of Dewey’s
philosophy in The Eclipse of Reason, written almost twenty years later. Although
Horkheimer takes note of the “many schools of thought” that have criticized
pragmatism, he himself cites only Hugo Münsterberg’s Philosophie der Werte and
Scheler’s “Erkenntnis und Arbeit” in [Scheler’s] Wissenformen und die
Gesellschaft” (Eclipse of Reason, p. 170).

5
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of Charles Sanders Peirce on James’s thought.6 Indeed, Peirce’s signal contribution to the
social philosophies of James’s most prominent successors in the pragmatist tradition
(most notably Mead and Dewey) consists in his anti-Cartesian, anti-phenomenalist
linkage of meaning and knowledge to action. More precisely, it was Peirce’s genetic
linkage of instrumental action undertaken by a single intelligent being to social action
undertaken by a community of knowers that would later inspire the progressive politics of
Mead and Dewey. So central to the thought of Mead and Dewey (and, to a lesser extent
Karl Popper) is this linkage of reflective natural adaption and social community that it
would later ground their view that free and fully inclusive democracy is central to the full
development of the kind of creative intelligence that is so necessary for progressive
problem solving of any kind.
Peirce expressly derived his notion of “pragmaticism” from Kant’s use of
pragmatisch in the Critique of Pure Reason (II, ch. 2, sec. 3) and the Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals (Sec. II), where Kant equates it with instrumental (prudential)
action guided by hypothetical (conditional) rules, in contrast with moral (practical) action
guided by categorical (unconditional) imperatives. Peirce himself was mainly interested
in showing how the meanings of many if not most general ideas (or signs) could be
interpreted in terms of general (counterfactual) conditionals. Such conditionals prescribe
the performance of an indefinite number of instrumental (experimental) actions that
achieve definite consequences. Thus, the meaning of “this diamond is hard” would be
6

For further discussion of Peirce, see Douglas R. Anderson, “Peirce and Pragmatism:
American ‘Schellingeanism,’” in History of Continental Philosophy. Volume 2: The
Revolutionary Age and/as Responses to Hegel, ed. Daniel W. Conway.
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explicable by a statement of the sort “If one were to scratch, illuminate, etc., this
substance, then consequences (such as failure to scratch, darken, etc.) would occur.”
Especially important for later pragmatists is the way in which Peirce connects this
account of meaning to an account of knowledge, truth, and logical probability. According
to Pierce, the meanings of our words are constant because they signify fixed beliefs.
These beliefs are acquired and confirmed in experimental situations in which the
outcomes are at best statistically probable but not absolutely certain. Probability, in turn,
designates a relative frequency, the average deviation from which diminishes in
proportion to the number of trials. The upshot is that the constancy of a sign’s meaning is
also relative to experimentally confirmed statistical frequencies produced over time.
Indeed, so is truth. For on Peirce’s account, it is the experimental method – not tenacity,
authority, or a priori reasoning – that enables us to approximate a lasting consensus in
the fixation of belief and thereby eliminate deviations that produce doubt. More
importantly, it is the experimental method as applied by an indefinite ideal community of
inquirers that gradually enables us to approximate (if not reach) a true and lasting
consensus over time regarding all of our beliefs, moral as well as cognitive.
Peirce’s insights regarding knowledge and meaning proved seminal for Dewey
and Mead. Dewey began his career as a Hegelian. During the period from 1890 to 1900,
his embrace of Hegelian idealism, with its notion of conceptual holism and conceptual
dialectic (or development) traversing stages of contradiction (analytic opposition and
distinction) and resolution (synthetic unification and identification), underwent a
profound naturalistic transformation. Under the influence of Darwin’s theory of
evolution, Dewey translated this dialectic into the idiom of biological organism and
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growth as a progressive process of environmental adaptation and change. His deeper
exposure to Peirce’s and James’s pragmatism around the turn of the century added a third
element to this equation: instrumentalism (or “experimental idealism” as he then
formulated it). As we shall see, Dewey’s instrumentalism bears a striking resemblance to
certain aspects of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology in its emphasis on the holistic
and situational nature of human understanding (or inquiry, as Dewey dubbed it). For
Dewey, human understanding involves an embodied attunement to an environment that is
already meaningful (circumscribed by language and community) but never determinately
so, thereby calling forth an on-going process of active interpretation (reconstruction) in
light of new questions, new problems, and new possibilities.
While Dewey was interested in working out the implications of instrumentalism
for a theory of democracy and education, Mead was chiefly preoccupied with applying
Peirce’s anti-Cartesian insights about the communal genesis of knowledge and meaning
to the new fields of developmental and social psychology. As with Dewey’s pragmatism,
Mead’s symbolic interactionism, which he also called social behaviorism, owes a great
deal to Hegel’s dialectical philosophy, especially its account of self-certainty, conceived
as a process of acquiring recognition from (internalizing the viewpoint of) another. For
Mead, one becomes a full self – an “I” who as subject can reflectively relate to itself as
object, or “me” – only in the course of proceeding through progressive stages of social
and symbolic interaction. As socialization proceeds, so does individuation. Ultimately,
the capacity of the self to internalize the impersonal and abstract role of language itself –
signified by the human community (or generalized other) – enables the self to critically
free itself from the particular social roles constitutive of itself as a nexus of social habits

8
(or “me”), thereby enabling it to become a uniquely creative inventor of its own values
and beliefs – in short, of its own identity as an “I.”

George Herbert Mead7

Mead’s entire career was informed by the Hegelian insight that “the whole is
more concrete than the part.”8 The rather meager corpus of essays and fragments that
constitute Mead’s oeuvre, most of which have been posthumously published in various
collections, repeatedly attest to the power this idea had on his thought. Once again, it is
Peirce’s notion of a community of interpretation as pivotal for understanding meaning
and belief that links this idealistic notion to an account of social behavior. Darwin’s
7

Mead was born in South Hadley, Massachusetts, on February 27, 1863 and died in
Chicago in April 26, 1931. He received his BA from Oberlin College (1879–83) and
began doing graduate work at Harvard in 1887, although he never wrote a
dissertation. In 1893 he was appointed professor of philosophy at the University of
Chicago, where he served in that capacity until his death. His main intellectual
influences were Adam Smith, Hegel, and Darwin. Among his most important books
are The Philosophy of the Present (1932), ed. Arthur E. Murphy; Mind, Self, and
Society (1934), ed. Charles W. Morris; Philosophy of the Act (1938), ed. Charles W.
Morris; Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead (1964); and The Individual and the
Social World: Unpublished Work of George Herbert Mead (1982).

8

Mead, Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead, p. 166.
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Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals provided Mead with an evolutionary
model for understanding the rudimentary social psychology of animal behavior.
Meanwhile, Dewey’s important work on the reflex (stimulus response) arc, which in
many ways anticipated Gestalt psychology as well as the phenomenology of perception
and behavior developed by Merleau-Ponty a half century later, provided him with a nonatomistic (non-mechanistic) model of organic behavior, understood as an interpretative
response that internalizes and reconstitutes a stimulus within a learning arc.9
Mead is chiefly concerned to show how mind and self emerge in the course of
traversing logical phases in the development of social and symbolic interaction. The most
primitive phase – “the conversation of gestures” – can be observed in animals, as when a
dog growls in order to ward off another dog. Darwin regarded such gestures as
expressions of inner emotional states, not as forms of social interaction. For Mead, the
gesture possesses significance for the dog toward whom the gesture is directed. The
gesture’s capacity to stimulate behavior causally depends on its being significant to its
recipient. As with Dewey, the stimulus only becomes effective by being constituted and
interpreted as significant. Here, however, the significance in question is established
socially, as a type or pattern of response (coordination) that comes to be shared.
So construed, there need not be anything like a “consciousness of meaning” on
the part of the dogs in question regarding the significance of their growling. Meaning and
language first emerge when the gesture becomes a “significant symbol.” That happens
9

Dewey’s “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” was published in the journal
Psychological Review in 1896. In 1942 a committee of seventy psychologists named
it the most significant contribution ever published in the journal.
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when the dogs learn how to use their growling gestures purposefully. The gesture of
growling becomes mutually meaningful once each dog “internalizes” the fact that
growling calls forth a specific behavior in the other dog. In order for this to happen, each
dog must take the attitude of the other dog toward his own behavior. That is, as a dog I
imagine myself being the other dog.10 In imagining myself thus, I learn to respond to my
own act, to reflect on myself.
Mead’s fascinating account of infantile role-playing connects the interactive
genesis of meaning with the social, moral, and cognitive development of the self. In play
a child imagines herself playing the roles of her parents or other significant others. She
conducts a conversation with herself, playing different roles, the meaning of which she
herself more or less freely constitutes (albeit, with the guidance of some incipient
models). When play becomes a game involving other children, the child has less freedom
to improvise, for here the roles have to be negotiated and agreed upon. In order to do this,
the child has to learn to take up the attitude of all her playmates. The game of tag, for
example, only works if the child who is “it” simultaneously adopts the attitude of all the
other players (in effect, playing out their assumed roles in the interiority of her mind).
10

Mead’s reference to the act of seeing oneself through the eyes of the other not only
paraphrases Hegel’s famous account of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology
but it recalls Adam Smith’s belief that in moral matters “[w]e suppose ourselves
spectators of our own behavior, and endeavor to imagine what effect [our own
passions and conduct] would, in this light [i.e., regards our feelings of approval or
censure] produce upon us” (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 112).
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It is this reflexive role-playing and attitude-taking competence that founds the
ability to participate in all other social groups, from the most local of neighborhood clubs
to the most all-inclusive humanity. In becoming social, the child learns to adopt the
standpoint of the generalized other. Ultimately, it is by internalizing the attitude of the
community in which she belongs that she internalizes the moral responses of that
community and becomes a “principled” person. But the self does not lose its individuality
in becoming so socialized. On the contrary, the capacity to adopt an abstract point of
view (that of the community or of humanity at large) enables one to critically objectify
and freely distance oneself from the multitude of particular roles one has internalized as
“me.”
Individuals, then, are the outcome of freely reconstituting and reinterpreting the
various habituated social roles within their repertory. Qua “me,” the individual is a
unique (and in that sense individual) confluence of sedimented social roles that one can
recall to memory (as a part of one’s already scripted autobiography). However, once
recalled to memory and made an object to oneself through adopting the attitude of a
second-person, the “me” can be set in dialogue with a more abstract aspect of the self,
which is formed by taking the role of a third-person observer – the generalized other
(representing the attitude of the social group taken as a whole).
In contrast to the “me,” which is the unconscious repository of social norms, the
“I” represents that part of the self who reacts almost impulsively against (or towards) the
attitude of the community and tries to change it. Unlike the “me,” the “I” cannot be
reflectively known as an object from the perspective of the second-person. Instead, as a
kind of instinctual or imaginative spontaneity, it deploys the critical admonitions of the
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conventional generalized other (the superego, in Freudian parlance) and projects these
onto the image of an ideal, utopian community in which the “I” along with all other “I”s
achieves perfect freedom and fulfillment. So construed, the “I” is the source of two kinds
of moral demands: a demand for moral autonomy, which finds expression in the
individual’s assertion of its rights against the conventional norms and laws of the
community, and a demand for self-realization.
In sum, the self is a dialectical movement, in that it becomes increasingly free and
individuated only to the extent that it expands the circle of recognition from the secondperson to the third-person, and from the conventional third-person to the ideal (universal)
third person. In this respect, individuation and socialization mutually condition one
another through the inextricable identity linking social dependency and individual
autonomy. Society and individual realize one another.

John Dewey11
11

Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont on October 20, 1859, and died in New York
City on June 1, 1952. He received his BA from the University of Vermont (1875–79)
and received his PhD from Johns Hopkins University in 1884. He was appointed
professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan until 1894, when he accepted
an appointment at the University of Chicago. He finished his career at Columbia
University in New York City (1905-1939). Charles Peirce (whose lectures on logic
he attended while at Johns Hopkins) and the neo-Hegelian idealism of George
Sylvester Morris were early influences during his graduate studies. Later influences
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Although logic and epistemology form the core of Dewey’s pragmatism, they
acquire a distinctive social and political significance in his writings that recall Mead’s
analysis of the ideal trajectory of socialization and individuation, embeddedness and
emancipation. For Dewey, inquiry necessarily involves a process of critical evaluation
that engages all aspects of our social being. As with Peirce, experimental inquiry is a
communal activity whose full potential is only realized in democracy, understood as a
critical, egalitarian communication of the experimental inputs of each and every member
of the community. So construed, community and democracy primarily function as social
instruments for problem solving.
A brief glance at some of Dewey’s major works – Logic: The Theory of Inquiry
(1938), Art as Experience (1934), Democracy and Education (1916), Experience and
Nature (1925) – confirms this assessment. What Dewey means by logic is a general
theory about the rules governing the formation of concepts, judgments, and inferences in
experimental situations; it is a complete theory of human thought and reasoning
conceived in instrumental terms. From an evolutionary point of view, instrumental
activity is the means by which humans adapt to and change their environment (and
thereby change themselves). Phenomenologically speaking, humans are not just spatially
inserted into the world as if they were things. Rather, they constitute the world they
inhabit; that is, their interests and concerns provide selective reference points for
interpreting their surrounding situation as a contextual, meaningful whole. Inquiry is

included William James and his colleague at the University of Chicago, George
Herbert Mead.
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initiated when the situation no longer presents itself as a determinate and coherent whole.
Biologically speaking, the human organism experiences a disruption of adaptive
functioning, a disequilibrium with respect to its environment as well as with respect to
itself. Re-establishing harmony requires reconstituting the situation (and therewith
oneself and one’s experience) in a logical succession of developmental stages. Stage one
involves reinterpretation (thoughtful redescription) of a problematic situation that
determines what might or not be relevant; stage two consists in formulating solutions to
the problematic situation that take the form of instrumental hypotheses; stage three
concretizes (further determines and delimits) the range of possible solutions by sifting
through factual observations that in turn suggest new “ideas” or ways of resolving the
problem; stage four deploys “reasoning” to articulate and define ideas in relationship to
one another by means of propositions and inferences; and the fifth and final stage
culminates in an experimental testing of the ideas so developed. If they prove successful,
then we are warranted in asserting them as “true” judgments just so long as they continue
to effect an operationally successful (existential) correspondence between the questions
posed by the situation and the answers posed by the inquirer.
The nature of inquiry not only incorporates critical evaluation of what, in a
problematic situation, is important to us – relative to our needs, desires, feelings, and
interests – but it provides a mechanism for reconstituting these very concerns. In other
words, inquiry constitutes the very contents of our moral life, and it constitutes them
within a continuous process of education and growth. The reference to growth has
teleological import: indeed, for Dewey, “growth itself is the only moral ‘end’.”12 The
12

Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 177.
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proper aim of education is thus to facilitate growth, by enabling the formation of
intelligent habits of thought and behavior. These, in turn, are teleologically directed
toward the resolution of conflicts – social as well as natural. While complete integration
with one’s environment is never achievable, it does point to the importance of joining
with others in peaceful democratic community in furthering the social and political
conditions that conduce to mutual growth. Social and political arrangements that are
premised on a false individualism (or false totalitarianism) violate these conditions; as do
any arrangements that generate social inequalities and conflicts
(or authoritarian solidarities).
Dewey’s own faith in a new liberalism reconstructed along the lines of a
democratic and scientific socialism recalls Mead’s discussion of the “emancipatory”
trajectory of genuine socialization . In many respects, Dewey’s liberalism – as developed
in Liberalism and Social Action (1935) and Individualism: Old and New (1929) – harks
back to John Stuart Mill’s appeal to Humboldt’s romantic paean to “individuality,” which
in turn recalls the Feuerbachian Hegelianism of the young Marx that proved so
compelling to members of the Frankfurt School of critical theory. Central to this
understanding is a belief that traditional liberalism and theoretical science are caught up
in a “dialectic of enlightenment,” to use Adorno and Horkheimer’s expression. According
to Dewey, the classical liberalism of Locke emancipated the individual from absolutist
forms of government, but only at the expense of dissolving the individual into an
“atomistic” ego, whose liberty was seen as an innate endowment cut off from society.
Such atomistic individualism informed the second, utilitarian wave of 19th-century
liberalism where, following Bentham’s teachings (adopted from Adam Smith), it
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entrenched itself in the form of laissez-faire economic liberalism. The result, correctly
diagnosed by Marx, was a contradiction between a socially and scientifically organized
form of industrial capitalism, on one side, and an individualistic legal conception of
private property, on the other. Here, the individual is but an alienated, fragmented, and
truncated self – a mere cog in a capitalist machine that operates according to an equally
one-sided (socially detached and anarchic) instrumental rationality, dominated by
scientific, technological, and managerial specialists who have no connection with the
“social whole.”
In Dewey’s opinion, the emergence of a new corporate (industrial) capitalism
signals a crisis of liberalism, in which the full flowering of liberalism’s own ideals of
freedom, individualism, and reason run up against a new form of economic, political, and
social domination. Exit from this crisis will come neither from piecemeal reform nor
violent revolution. Salvation, for Dewey, will rather come from harnessing the older
method of democratic discussion to the newer method of scientific experimentation, now
conceived as an all-inclusive activity of social intelligence. Properly conceived, social
science does not merely discover and apply timeless social laws for purposes of
prediction and control, but clarifies concrete social problems with the aim of critically
evaluating and altering existing social patterns. Its criticism of social ideologies (old
habits and prejudices) serves to raise social consciousness and enlighten transformative
democratic practice. Reconstructed as a radical social(ist) democracy, the new,
scientifically enlightened liberalism will critically integrate and reconstitute the material
needs of producers and consumers in the direction of fulfilling higher-order social and
spiritual needs.
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Positivism

Given Rudolf Carnap’s dismissal of Heidegger’s philosophy and Bertrand
Russell’s negative caricature of German philosophy in general (not to mention his sharp
criticism of James’s philosophy), we might be forgiven the all too easy temptation to
oppose logical positivism and analytic philosophy to pragmatism.13 Yet, despite the fact
that positivism and pragmatism have somewhat different pedigrees (British empiricism
versus German Idealism), methods (individualism versus holism), and projects (analyzing
abstract concepts with universal scope versus interpreting concepts against the
background of concrete historical practices, establishing the indubitable certainty/truth of
beliefs versus describing their social and historical genesis), their respective practitioners
share much in common. Both embrace some form of naturalism; preferring scientific and
logical approaches, they disdain the use of transcendental methods of philosophical
introspection that proved so indispensable to their continental counterparts. They also
incline towards experimentalist accounts of meaning and knowledge. Given this
convergence, we should not be surprised that positivist and post-positivist thinkers such
as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Karl Popper, Wilfred Sellars, Nelson Goodman, and W. V. O.
13

For a discussion of the Carnap-Heidegger relation, see Michael Friedman and Thomas
Ryckman, “Analytic and Continental Traditions: Frege, Husserl, Carnap, and
Heidegger,” in History of Continental Philosophy. Volume 3: The New Century, ed.
Keith Ansell Pearson and Alan D. Schrift.
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Quine characterized themselves (or were characterized by others, such as American
pragmatist Charles W. Morris) as pragmatists. Indeed, Dewey himself co-edited a book
with several noted logical positivists and even contributed an article to that volume;14 and
as they migrated to the United States, logical positivists tried to enlist Dewey’s
philosophy in their own cause.
Logical positivism is an expression coined by Herbert Feigl and A. E. Blumberg
in 1931 to describe the ideas of the Vienna Circle, whose most important associates –
including Carnap, Feigl, Otto Neurath, Hans Reichenbach, and Gustav Bergmann – later
immigrated to England (where they were sympathetically received by the reigning
analytic philosophy made popular by Wittgenstein, Russell, and A.J. Ayer) and the
United States (where they transformed or undermined the prevailing pragmatist ethos).
Logical positivists were strongly motivated by a quest for logical clarity and epistemic
certainty. These logical and empirical concerns were brought together under a single
program – the so-called “verificationist” theory of meaning that had been advanced by
Wittgenstein in his Tractatus (1921). Wittgenstein intended his theory as a criticism of
any philosophy that deviates from the narrow logical task of “showing” how our
language means, or “pictures” a world of “atomic facts,” but its immediate effect was to
consign all non-factual propositions (propositions whose truth or falsity could not in
principle be verifiable by observation) as “meaningless.” The results were deeply
disturbing and paradoxical: not only were the evaluative and expressive statements of
ethics, religion, metaphysics, and aesthetics suddenly consigned to practical irrelevance,
14

See Dewey, “Unity of Science as a Social Problem,” in Neurath, Carnap, Dewey, et al.,
Encyclopedia and Unified Science.
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but (as Wittgenstein ironically noted) so were the propositions of philosophy that asserted
the verificationist theory of meaning. Indeed, the specter of Hume’s skepticism regarding
induction that the school had sought to exorcise reappeared with a vengeance once it
became clear that the general law-like propositions of science whose truth, as pragmatists
had taught, could never be fully verified, were equally meaningless on this account.
Despite the challenges that verificationism posed to philosophy and science (see
below), logical positivists believed that the nomological method of causal explanation
and the inductive method of causal discovery were, taken together, the only methods for
grounding knowledge and meaning. Consequently, they subscribed to a reductive, unified
view of knowledge that sharply contrasted with the logical distinction between natural
and human sciences that neo-Kantians such as Dilthey had popularized a generation
earlier. In short, positivists maintained that the historical, sociological, and psychological
sciences must not deviate from the experimental and nomological (or “covering law”)
methods of causal explanation exemplified by the natural sciences on pain of being
rendered totally “unscientific” and meaningless.
Verificationism and reductionism – the two shibboleths of logical positivism –
would eventually come under attack from philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, Popper,
Sellars,15 Goodman,16 and Quine17 – who had considered themselves to be sympathetic to
15

Wilfrid Sellars (1912–89) firmly rejected epistemological foundationalism. One of the
first philosophers to integrate Anglo-American analytic philosophy and AustroGerman logical positivism with American pragmatism and Hegelian thought, he
devoted much of his life to reconciling the naturalist, “scientific image” of reality
with the commonsense (or “manifest”) image of the same held by average persons.
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Key to this attempt, however, was his non-reductive distinction between the
(naturalistic) space of experiential genesis via causal processes and (linguistic or
propositional) space of belief formation and reasoned justification. Today he is
considered by many to be the founder of inferential semantics, whose leading
contemporary torchbearer is his former student, Robert Brandom, who is also a selfdescribed Hegelian pragmatist. Among Sellars’s most important papers are
“Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956) and “Philosophy and the Scientific
Image of Man” (1962).
16

Nelson Goodman (1906–98) made significant contributions to mathematic logic, the
theory of induction, and aesthetics. Goodman believed that a nominalistic calculus
of individuals should be the starting point for reconstructing mathematical logic
(which he and Quine held, following American pragmatist premises, could not be
distinguished in principle from empirical science) rather than set theory (this is the
basis for Goodman’s variant of “mereology.” He also held, against Hempel, that
causal (law-like) generalizations could not be distinguished from accidental
generalizations (thereby re-formulating the Humean problem of induction), at least
in everyday contexts in which the use of predicates is not sharply fixed by formal
stipulation. Goodman’s hypothetical example of “grue,” which applies to all green
things examined before a certain time t and to all blue things examined after t, shows
that an apparent law-like generalization “Emeralds are green” would confirm
(according to the generalization that “all green things are grue”) the generalization
that “Emeralds are blue” after t, thereby showing that anything can confirm anything
depending on our accidental methods of classifying types. Finally, Goodman’s most
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some aspects of the positivist cause. Carnap and Neurath had argued (against Moritz
Schlick) that scientific laws were not merely inferential rules connecting singular factual
statements but were themselves factual claims subject to potential verification or
falsification. But how? Were such generalizations verified (falsified) by experience, as
many positivists thought? As Neurath (followed by Sellars and Quine) pointed out, only
a proposition can verify (justify) a proposition. Were such generalizations then
translatable as sets of first-person observation statements (protocol statements), as Carnap
suggested? If these statements were formulated as dated observations of physical objects,
such as tables and rooms, then such reports would be an unreliable basis for confirmation
or falsification, since it might be doubted whether these observations were veridical. On
the other hand, if they were formulated as dated observations of private sensory

famous work – in the area of aesthetics – showed how art and the aesthetic could be
understood as creating new ontological worlds (or vocabularies for perceiving and
describing reality) in a way that converged with Heidegger’s own views about the
ontological import of the work of art. Goodman’s most important student at Harvard
was the neo-pragmatist Hilary Putnam. Among his most famous works are The
Structure of Appearance (1951), Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1955), and Ways of
Worldmaking (1978).
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Norman Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) is most famous for attacking the analyticsynthetic distinction and with it, the verificationist theory of meaning, the two pillars
of logical positivism (see below). His most important books include From a Logical
Point of View (1953), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (1969), and The Ways
of Paradox and Other Essays (1976).
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experiences (“here, now, blue” as Schlick insisted), then their subjective certainty would
be purchased at the cost of their un-translatability into objective statements.

Post-Positivism

For post-positivists such as Quine and Popper, the paradoxes surrounding
verificationism were best resolved by jettisoning the theory. Like the pragmatists, they
argued that scientific generalizations are not constructed out of particular experiences
(induction) but are experimental hypotheses formulated by prior theories, which are
themselves the products of imagination. Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic
distinction in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) was especially effective in
undermining the positivist distinction between necessary (analytic or identity) statements
concerning logical meaning and contingent (synthetic or empirically informative)
statements concerning experience and behavior – a distinction Dewey himself had
vigorously criticized many years earlier in his 1938 Logic, when he observed that
“[w]hen a linguistic form is separated from the contextual matter of problem inquiry it is
impossible to decide of what logical form it is the expression.” Accordingly, the dogma
of a theory- (concept- or meaning-) independent experience that could stand as an
independent standard for constructing and testing a theory was laid to rest.

Karl Popper
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For his part, Popper held that induction could not confirm scientific hypotheses
because (as Peirce had seen) they refer to an indefinite number of counterfactual tests.
The “necessary connection” that distinguishes causal relations from non-necessary but
relatively invariant correlations of past events – the problem of induction diagnosed by
Hume – can only be articulated when such hypotheses are formulated as counterfactual
conditionals of the form: “Had y not happened, z would not have happened.” Because
scientific hypotheses are counterfactual, they cannot be definitively verified by past and
present experiences (events) but can only be falsified with reference to present and future
experiences. Hence, for Popper, the true test for the meaningfulness of a scientific theory
is its capacity to generate potentially falsifiable hypotheses. But this attempt to save
positivism – by replacing verification with falsification – also fails, since as Quine later
argued (and Popper himself conceded), disconfirming tests do not suffice to falsify a
given hypothesis so much as place in doubt a system of interconnected supporting
hypotheses. Which hypothesis we choose to eliminate in order to restore coherence is
thus not determined exclusively by our observations. Our epistemic commitments – for
instance, how central a hypothesis is within the web of our otherwise workable belief
system – also play a role. This pragmatic insight would later inspire Thomas Kuhn’s
conception of scientific revolutions,18 in which changes in scientific paradigm are
stimulated by anomalous test results only when a potentially more fruitful (if inarticulate
and as of yet unconfirmed) paradigm has gained support from the majority of a scientific
community.
18

Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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Popper’s criticism of verificationism did not extend to positivism’s other defining
postulates: unificationism and fact-value dualism. Along with Carl Hempel, he insisted
that the historical and social sciences yield meaningful hypotheses only insofar as their
explanation of events and actions are capable of being framed in terms of general (or
statistical) laws of behavior. Such causal explanations could be useful to the formation of
public policies aimed at piecemeal social reform. In contrast with these hypothetical
technical predictions, the grandiose revolutionary experiments undertaken by such
totalitarian movements as fascism and communism are not guided by scientific
knowledge, despite contrary claims offered by their proponents.
Popper’s two-volume magnum opus The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945),
and his shorter treatise The Poverty of Historicism (1957), link this narrow scientific
claim to a broader conception of morality, action, and politics in a manner that merits
closer scrutiny. To begin with, Popper argues that the laws of historical development and
social evolution that defenders of total revolution advocate – what he referred to as
“historicism” – are ultimately meaningless, since they do not yield falsifiable
hypotheses.19 Such laws as inform Marx’s historical materialism, which ostensibly
postulates an inevitable progression of social formations (modes of production)
culminating in communism, Plato’s views about the inevitable decline of well-ordered
polities into tyranny, or fascist doctrines about the fateful struggle and victory of master
19

Popper’s notion of historicism must not be confused with the concept of historicism
that was used by Husserl, Dilthey, and other (mainly neo-Kantian) thinkers at the
turn of the century, for whom the term referred to a kind of historical relativity in the
understanding of distinctive historical epochs and cultural worldviews.
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races are all examples of unscientific (and irrational) ideologies. The architects who use
such ideologies to construct their revolutionary societies cannot allow any actions that
deviate from the predicted outcome, so they insist on totalitarian controls that transform
modern societies that are otherwise open, liberal, and democratic (or on the cusp of
becoming so) into societies that are primitive, closed, and tribal.
According to Popper, the critical rationalism inherent within science demands an
open society. Persons must be free to imagine new hypotheses; ultimately, the values
(moral and non-moral) that guide the inventive formulation of hypotheses are themselves
the outcome of existential decisions that are entirely unpredictable. The fact that the
consequences and meanings of actions transcend the intentions of actors and that the
latter are themselves critically generated and revised within the context of multi-vocal
and open-ended conversations means that the predictions of predetermined outcomes
made by revolutionary social engineers must come to naught. As another contemporary
Kantian, Hannah Arendt, astutely noted in her criticism of totalitarianism, the
revolutionary spirit underlying utopian moral idealism inevitably shatters against the hard
fact of moral freedom.

The Contemporary Influence of American Pragmatism and Logical Positivism

As I noted earlier, once logical positivism became transplanted onto American
soil by German and Austrian émigrés fleeing Nazi Germany it was vigorously promoted
as a more analytically rigorous – and ostensibly superior – way of doing philosophy than
its pragmatist counterpart. Hence the virtual disappearance of pragmatism in major PhD-
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granting philosophy departments during the fifties and sixties. There is also some
anecdotal evidence, assembled by John McCumber, that political motivations may also
have contributed to this change.20 Although positivists like Carnap and Neurath had leftwing sympathies, their philosophy had the distinct merit of being untainted by the leftleaning, social progressivism that marked Mead’s and Dewey’s pragmatism. Limiting
philosophy to the singular task of conceptual clarification and epistemological
foundationalism, logical positivists eschewed normative ethics altogether in favor of
meta-ethical ruminations on the meaning of “ought,” “good,” and the like. As a
worldview that promoted skepticism of any holistic or global historical (or totalizing)
understanding of social and economic structures, even Popper’s critical rationalism could
at best promote piecemeal reform of a system that was largely taken for granted.
During the McCarthy Era, Popper’s relatively weak vision of an open society of
free inquirers was not to be found among American philosophy departments. Yet despite
the near total eclipse of pragmatism, post-positivist tendencies that drew from (or
otherwise replicated) ideas developed by pragmatist philosophers gradually supplanted
positivist shibboleths. The Anglo-American world was thus well-prepared for the
renaissance of neo-pragmatist thought that was ushered in by Richard Rorty’s Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature in 1979 and alternatively taken up by such notable philosophers
as Hilary Putnam and (more recently), John McDowell and Robert Brandom.21
20

McCumber, Time in a Ditch.
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These developments are discussed in several essays in the following volumes; see
David R. Hiley, “Rorty among the Continentals,” in History of Continental
Philosophy. Volume 6: Poststructuralism and Critical, ed. Alan D. Schrift; José
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Oddly, despite the affinities between pragmatism and continental philosophy –
notably Heideggerian phenomenology and Frankfurt-School neo-Marxism – there was
virtually no productive interchange between these currents of thought until the seventies.
I mentioned the utter failure of Max Horkheimer and other first-generation critical
theorists to read the works of Dewey seriously.22 Therefore, in concluding this essay, I

Medina, “The Performative Turn and the Emergence of Post-Analytic Philosophy,”
in History of Continental Philosophy. Volume 7: Post-Poststructuralism, ed. Rosi
Braidotti; and John Fennell, “Re-Thinking Anglo-American Philosophy: The NeoKantianism of Davidson, McDowell, and Brandom,” in History of Continental
Philosophy. Volume 8: Emerging Trends in Continental Philosophy, ed. Todd May.
22

Dewey is the philosopher most often mentioned by Horkheimer in The Eclipse of
Reason. Yet James Schmidt points out that Horkheimer’s discussion of Dewey and
pragmatism in the second of the Columbia University Lectures he gave in 1944 that
would later form the core of his book was an afterthought. Indeed, Horkheimer was
only prompted to correct the interpretation of pragmatism contained in the lecture
when he wrote his manuscript, which was critically reviewed by C. Wright Mills,
who believed that Horkheimer had grasped pragmatism “in a rather vulgar form”
and without apparent familiarity with the primary texts. Although Horkheimer told
Leo Lıwenthal that he felt he had become “an expert” on American pragmatism,
having read “not a few of these native products,” his belief that pragmatism and
positivism were virtually indistinguishable, save for the latter’s “phenomenalism”
(“sensualistic idealism”), belies this judgment. In Horkheimer’s opinion,
pragmatism, no less than positivism, identifies philosophy with scientism, which by
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would like to recall how the Frankfurt School’s own struggle with positivism led it to
eventually recover the legacy of American pragmatism well before it became fashionable
in the English-speaking world.
The positivist postulates of scientific unificationism and fact-value dualism were
strenuously resisted by philosophers influenced by the linguistic philosophy of the late
Wittgenstein and, on the continent, by critical theorists. Critical theorists such as Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer saw positivism (including Popper’s critical rationalism) as
fundamentally uncritical and reactionary. The positivist dismissal of evaluative language,
its insistence on defining truth and meaning in terms of correspondence with atomic facts
or subjectively given sense experiences – in total abstraction from the broader historical,
economic, political, and socio-cultural context conditioning perception, thought, and
language – struck them as a false and ideological affirmation of the status quo. While
they did not deny the epistemic value of predictive and technically useful knowledge
within the behavioral sciences, critical theorists regarded such knowledge as but a
subordinate aspect within social science taken as a whole, the proper aim of which, they
maintained, was not instrumental prediction and control of human behavior but the
critique of “naturalizing” ideologies that depict society as a realm of rigid, unchanging
laws.

its very nature is subjectivistic in that “true judgments on objects, and therewith the
concept of the object itself, rests solely on ‘effects’ upon the subject’s action”
(Eclipse of Reason, p. 45). See Schmidt, “The Eclipse of Reason and the End of the
Frankfurt School in America.”
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The so-called “positivist dispute” of the early sixties that pitted Popper and his
followers against Adorno and his former assistant, Jürgen Habermas, brought the issue of
“critical social knowledge” into stark relief. Popperians defended a unified scientific
method as the only empirically responsible approach to social critique and impugned the
holistic hermeneutical methods of critical theorists as an uncritical recrudescence of
Hegelian dialectical metaphysics. Critical theorists responded that social scientists could
not causally explain human behavior without first interpreting it as meaningful and normgoverned in a way that referred to interests, ideas, and utopian ideals that simultaneously
corresponded to and conflicted with the laws of capitalist accumulation. Furthermore,
they bridled at the fact/value distinction upheld by the Popperians, which consigned
critical evaluations to the irrational status of existential decisions. This was a
“decisionism,” they believed, that could all too easily degenerate into a resolute
acquiescence to the powers that be, as exemplified by the illustrative fate of Carl Schmitt
and Martin Heidegger.
Habermas enlisted none other than Wittgenstein himself in arguing against the
unified science postulate maintained by the Popperians. Wittgenstein’s late philosophy
of language, the most mature of expression of which is expounded in his posthumous
work, Philosophical Investigations (1953), develops a pragmatist account of meaning that
is completely antithetical to the positivist view he had earlier developed in the
Tractatus.23 In the mature work, Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of language is
23

For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s turn against his own earlier views in the Tractatus,
see the essay by Bob Plant and John Fennell in History of Continental Philosophy.
Volume 3, ed. Ansell Pearson and Schrift.
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holistic and contextual (syncategorematic) and linked to observable use rather than to
ostensive reference. Language games comprise speech-acts that, in the parlance of
Wittgenstein’s follower John Austin, accomplish illocutionary (social action-oriented)
aims and have perlocutionary (behavior-modifying) effects. Such games, in turn,
circumscribe rule-governed “ways of life” that are inherently public and shared.
As developed by Peter Winch in his pioneering manifesto The Idea of Social
Science (1958), the implication of this Wittgensteinian theory of meaning for explaining
human action was nothing less than momentous, in that it reaffirmed the dualism between
natural and human science that formerly had been defended by neo-Kantians. According
to Winch, meaningful action is distinguished from brute behavior in being essentially
structured and identified by the intentions of the actor. Such intentions are therefore not
discrete psychic causes that precede physical action as Popper, Hempel, and other
advocates of the so-called “covering law” model of social and historical explanation had
maintained. On the contrary, intentional actions cannot be causally explained with
reference to social laws but can only be understood and interpreted within the context of
a rule-governed language game, or way of life. More precisely, the intentions of the actor
– what it is he or she intends to do by his or her action – implicitly refers to norms of
speaking and acting. To explain an action is therefore to understand it as a meaningful
instance of a norm that could, in principle, be creatively applied or even violated.
The Wittgensteinian revolution in philosophy of language proved pivotal for the
development of later critical theory. It enabled the most notable exponents of this theory,
Karl-Otto Apel and Habermas, to recover the lost insights of the pragmatist tradition,
above all Peirce’s operationalist theory of meaning and Mead’s social behaviorist
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account of mind, in the sixties and seventies – well in advance of the renaissance of
Anglo-American neo-pragmatism.24 This appropriation of classical pragmatism has
continued apace under third-generation critical theorists, Axel Honneth and Hans Joas,
whose use of Dewey and, above all, Mead, to develop new theories of recognition and
democracy has taken critical theory more deeply into the heart of social progressivism.25
In the hands of Habermas and Apel, pragmatism was used to construct a
transcendental theory of knowledge-constitutive interests as an alternative to positivist
“objectivism.” Following Habermas’s formulation of this new program of critical
pragmatism, different interests that have emerged in the course of the natural history of
the human species determine distinctive frameworks of action and knowledge.
Corresponding to a technical interest in controlling nature-like processes is instrumental
action – articulated in experimental methods – that serves to stabilize successful beliefs
24

Apel’s epochal introduction of American pragmatism (principally Peircian semiotics)
to the German public appeared in his two volume study The Transformation of
Philosophy (1973), which also displays a great debt to the neo-Kantian tradition of
Dilthey and the post-positivist philosophy of the late Wittgenstein. Habermas’s
indebtedness to Peirce is evident in his earlier work, Knowledge and Human
Interests (1968), while his use of Mead later appears in the second volume of his
Theory of Communicative Action (1981).
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For discussions of these developments in the second and third generations of critical
theorists, see respectively the essays by James Swindal in History of Continental
Philosophy. Volume 6, ed. Schrift, and Amy Allen in History of Continental
Philosophy. Volume 7, ed. Braidotti.
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about cause and effect. Corresponding to a practical interest in understanding ourselves
and (reaching) understanding (with) others is communicative action – articulated in
historical interpretative methods – that serves to stabilize right beliefs about identities,
norms, values, and ends. Corresponding to an emancipatory interest is critical reflection –
articulated in psychotherapeutic methods combining causal explanation and holistic
understanding – that serves to expose distortions in self-understanding caused by the
effects of domination.
Since the late seventies, Habermas’s critical theory has evolved into a full-blown
theory of communicative action whose debt to pragmatism – especially to Mead and
Wittgenstein – is evident in the name he gives his philosophy of language: universal
pragmatics. If anything, the newer generation of critical theorists has sought to wrest the
materialist spirit of pragmatism even further from the Kantian dualisms that still define
Habermas’s theory. Needless to say, all of this testifies to the continuing impact of
pragmatism on the future of German critical philosophy.

